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Every arbitration aficionado knows the expression: "An arbitration
is only as good as the arbitrator" ("Tant vaut l'arbitre, tant vaut
l'arbitrage"). However, the party or arbitral institution which wishes to
find a "good" arbitrator must nonetheless step back before making any
selection in order first to formulate a clear definition of "arbitration" it-
self and its objectives.
Of course, articles, books and entire conferences have been devoted
to the subject of arbitration, but for the purposes of this article it is possi-
ble to be brief. From the point of view of the International Chamber of
Commerce and the International Court of Arbitration1 it established in
1923, arbitration is a means of helping to promote and facilitate interna-
* Secretary General of the International Court of Arbitration. The opinions expressed herein
are those of the author and do not bind or necessarily reflect those of the International Court of
Arbitration.
1 The word "international" was added to the Court's name by a decision of the Council of the
International Chamber of Commerce in 1989 in order to better reflect the nature of the composition
of the Court (as of 1991 there are some 55 Court members of 47 different nationalities) and the basic
premises underlying its Rules and its approach to the arbitrations it administers.
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tional commerce and investment by providing a neutral, independent and
impartial method of resolving international commercial disputes through
effective and reasonably predictable procedures.
These objectives should be achieved as rapidly and inexpensively as
the circumstances of each case permits as it cannot be forgotten that for
the business person time is money and money is also money. Moreover,
the parties will accept the alternative of arbitration only insofar as they
are confident that the objectives sought are truly obtainable and the
means required to reach these objectives are available. In this regard,
each international contract permits the parties to "vote with their arbi-
tration clauses" for the arbitral institution or set of rules which they con-
sider to best meet their needs.
Let it also not be forgotten that, as Eric Robine, Chief of the Legal
Service of GEC Alsthom recently stated,2 "if the parties have resort to
arbitration, it is because they have not been able to reach a friendly settle-
ment. The only thing that the arbitrators must do then, is to decide in
law.... A request for arbitration, and this should be obvious, is not a
request for conciliation."
In short, an arbitrator must have what Professor Pierre Lalive has
called' the "ability to judge," which implies a capacity to evaluate con-
flicting statements of law and/or fact and to have the wisdom, courage
and expertise to reach and render a decision in such a way that the par-
ties - and perhaps most of all the losing party - will recognize both the
essential fairness of the procedure and the futility of efforts to overturn
the award or oppose its execution. Only when this occurs, as happens in
about ninety percent of ICC cases, can arbitration truly achieve the rela-
tive economy, celerity and finality sought by the business community.
With this understanding of what the "good" arbitration consists of,
we return to the question of how best to select the "good" arbitrator only
to realize that the observation with which this paper began, repeated so
often as to become a cich6, in fact offers no practical guidance to the
parties and the arbitral institutions facing the daunting task of selecting,
and sometimes removing, arbitrators.
Inspired by Lord Justice Michael Mustill's statement that the ICC
Court's "recent concentration on practical issues, rather than debates on
overworked theoretical questions, has created a climate in which the seri-
ous problems which face international commercial arbitration today can
2 Le choix des Arbitres, REVUE DE L'ARB1TRAGE 330 (1990).




be faced in a truly ecumenical intellectual spirit,"4 this paper will en-
deavor to provide concrete, practical information by drawing upon the
experience of the ICC International Court of Arbitration.
During the past twelve years, some 3500 arbitration cases have been
submitted to the ICC Court5 (itself composed of experienced lawyers of
some forty-seven nationalities) involving many thousands of parties from
over 100 countries around the world. From the thousands of arbitrators
of over fifty nationalities proposed by parties and confirmed (or, more
rarely, not confirmed) by the ICC Court, from the thousands of sole arbi-
trators or chairpersons of Arbitral Tribunals appointed by the ICC
Court, and from the hundred or so challenges of arbitrators acted upon
by the ICC Court, certain pragmatic observations may be distilled even if
eternal verities are harder to find.
II. THE QUALIFCATIONS OF THE "IDEAL" ARBITRATOR
One "eternal verity" is, however, immediately apparent. Just as
there does not exist an ideal arbitration clause suitable for every con-
tract,6 neither does there exist any arbitrator suitable for every
arbitration.
While perhaps also true for purely domestic arbitrations, it is espe-
cially evident that the "perfect" arbitrator does not exist in the field of
international commercial arbitration given the multiplicity of changing
elements (nationalities, languages, situs, applicable law(s), etc.).
A. Selection of Arbitrators by a Party: Some Factors
to Take into Account
L How Many Arbitrators Should There Be?
This question arises because in their arbitral clause the parties may,
under the rules of many arbitration systems including the ICC, either
decide the point or leave it open (as does the standard ICC Clause). In
1990, 58.3% of the cases initiated before the ICC Court had three-mem-
ber arbitral tribunals. Regarding the stage at which the decision was
made to have an arbitral tribunal consisting of three persons, in 50% of
the cases the decision was contained in the arbitral clause itself, in 30%
of the cases there was a subsequent agreement to this effect by the parties,
4 Mustill, Arbitration: History and Background, 6 J. INT'L ARB. 48 (1989).
5 Case 7000 was submitted to the ICC in late 1990. It took 55 years for the first 3500 cases to be
submitted to the ICC, this simple statistic being one evidence of the growing importance of interna-
tional commercial arbitration in a world of expanding international trade and investment.
6 Bond, How to Draft an Arbitration Clause (Revisited), 1 ICC INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
ARBrrATION BULLETIN 14 (1990).
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and in the remaining 20% of the cases the decision was made by the ICC
Court.
Of the 41.7% of the cases in which a sole arbitrator was decided
upon, in only 10% of these cases was the decision contained in the arbi-
tral clause. The parties subsequently agreed to have a sole arbitrator in
44.7% of the cases and the ICC Court itself made this decision in the
remaining 45.6% of the cases.
Obviously, the choice of three arbitrators generally permits each
party to participate in the constitution of the arbitral tribunal by propos-
ing a co-arbitrator, with all of the attendant advantages and disadvan-
tages. The general consensus seems to be that in cases involving complex
questions of law or fact, the deliberations of a panel of arbitrators help
assure a more thorough analysis of the issues.
In contrast, the ICC experience indicates that where there is a sole
arbitrator, he or she will be selected by a third-party, most often the
institution administering the arbitration. Thus, in only 14% of the 1990
cases with a sole arbitrator did the parties themselves reach agreement on
the actual person who should be named. It can, therefore, readily be seen
that in exchange for the economy and rapidity of a sole arbitrator as
compared to a larger arbitral tribunal, the parties in most instances relin-
quish the opportunity to have any role whatsoever in the selection of the
arbitral tribunal. This may help explain why in the past many parties
from Eastern Europe and developing countries have been quite insistent
that there be three arbitrators, even when this is counterproductive from
the point of view of cost. (The explanation for this is given below.)
2. When Should the Selection of an Arbitrator Be Made?
Occasionally a desire for absolute certainty leads parties to insert in
the arbitration clause contained in their contract the identities of the ar-
bitrator(s). The problems apparent in this approach are obvious: when a
dispute actually arises sometime thereafter, the person(s) named in the
clause may no longer be independent, available, trusted, or even alive.
Of course, there may still be a few countries in the world where
legislation or jurisprudence requires that the arbitrators be named in the
arbitral clause. For example, this appears to be the case for domestic
Egyptian arbitrations. Some Egyptian defendants in certain arbitrations
have argued that the relevant provision of the civil code is also applicable
in international arbitrations. This is, apparently, a minority view. The
Egyptian Cour de Cassation already decided7 that the provision did not
7 Judgment of Apr. 26, 1982, Decision No. 714 of the judicial year 47.
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apply in a case where the situs of the arbitration was outside of Egypt.
The Court of Appeal of Cairo recently decided along the same lines in a
case where the situs of the international arbitration was within Egypt.'
However, in general it is certainly preferable to avoid naming the arbitral
tribunal in the arbitration clause. Indeed, during the six years during
which the author has been with the ICC, such a clause has appeared but
once or twice.
3. Professional Qualifications
In certain countries, especially those of the common law, a debate
over professional qualifications can degenerate into something akin to a
gladiator contest. Those with experience in "maritime" or "commodity"
arbitration, for example, will point out that non-lawyers can and do han-
dle such arbitrations to the general satisfaction of all concerned.
However, in international commercial arbitrations, where awards
must generally set out the reasoning of the arbitral tribunal; where the
validity and enforceability of awards, if challenged, are decided upon by
judges; and where questions of jurisdiction, applicable law and statutory
interpretation must often (and increasingly) be decided upon by the arbi-
tral tribunal, legal training is a minimum requirement and legal practice
is preferable.
In ICC arbitrations the latter position, with some notable excep-
tions, has essentially carried the day in that at least 95% of the arbitra-
tors proposed by the parties themselves are lawyers, professors of law, in-
house counsel, or other legal professionals.
The author can recall one case where the arbitration clause called
for a three-person tribunal to be composed of "commercial-men" and
each party ended up proposing a lawyer.
4. Nationality
Except for a decreasing number of arbitral institutions with a closed
list of arbitrators who have the nationality of the country where the insti-
tution is located, parties are generally free to choose an arbitrator of any
nationality whatsoever. The ICC does not even have a "list" of
arbitrators.9
8 Hohafazat of Port Said, Suez Canal Authority v. Polaco Holding S.A., Casino Palace Port
Said SAE, International Chamber of Commerce.
9 On occasion one sees a C.V. or other document where a person denominates him or herself as
an "ICC Arbitrator". No such qualification in fact exists, as a French Court pointed out several
years ago. Tribunal de Grande Instance, Paris (ord. r6f.), January 15, 1988, Revue de l'Arbitrage
316, 1988. At most, a person can say that he or she has served as an arbitrator in one or more ICC
arbitrations.
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The question thus arises whether the co-arbitrator to be proposed
should have the nationality of the proposing party, of the country which
is the situs of the arbitration, or of the country the law of which is
applicable.
While no statistics are yet available, the general impression of the
author is that parties from developing countries and Eastern Europe
have traditionally placed considerable importance on proposing a co-
arbitrator of their own nationality while Western parties place more pri-
ority on proposing a co-arbitrator with a particular expertise in the appli-
cable national law, the field of law concerned (construction, high-tech,
etc.) or a general expertise in arbitration regardless of nationality. Of
course, the arbitrator proposed by the non-Western party may be of
equal or greater expertise than his or her Western counterpart. The point
is simply that the non-Western party will make greater efforts to find a
person with the requisite expertise and the same nationality as that party.
The main reason for this differing approach can well be imagined:
the non-Western party often considers that an arbitrator with an intimate
knowledge of the legal and economic context within which the party op-
erates and coming from the same social, cultural and linguistic milieu as
that party best ensures that the party's position on the issues before the
arbitral tribunal is well understood by all of the arbitrators. This would
be an entirely legitimate objective, fully consistent with the requirement
for independence and will be further discussed below. Interestingly, the
former "socialist" countries of Central and Eastern Europe now appear
to be increasingly willing to accept a sole arbitrator as opposed to three
(see point A (1) above) and this trend may eventually translate into a
lessening of the traditional preference to appoint a fellow national as a
co-arbitrator.
5. Age and Health
Law is one of the blessed professions in which age is considered to
impart wisdom. Nonetheless, where an arbitration will obviously be
complex and lengthy, a party may wish to try to determine whether the
health of a potential co-arbitrator will allow him or her to function effi-
ciently under conditions of stress, travel, etc.
6. Sex
Very few arbitrators have been women, but this is no doubt a reflec-
tion of what has been the past situation in the legal profession, a situation
which is rapidly changing. Apart from a very few special cases (in Saudi
Arabia, for example, an arbitrator apparently must be male, Muslim and
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of good character, although these requirements appear not to be applica-
ble to arbitrations outside of Saudi Arabia unless the parties have agreed
that the procedural rules of Saudi Arabia govern the arbitration), there is
no evident reason why any distinction should be made between qualified
arbitrators on the basis of gender.
Z Linguistic Ability
A formal requirement that a co-arbitrator have particular linguistic
skills is exceedingly rare. However, where the co-arbitrator does not
speak the agreed language of the arbitration, the proposing party may
well end up bearing the costs of translation and/or interpretation. Per-
haps more importantly, the co-arbitrator who can converse with the
other members of the tribunal in a common language may establish
greater rapport with them, a psychological factor which should not be
underestimated.
8. Availability
The availability of an arbitrator is an essential concern that is often
overlooked or ignored by the parties. Many claimants who wish their
case to proceed as rapidly as possible will make strenuous efforts to se-
cure a "top" arbitrator yet fail to inquire whether he or she has the time
available to permit the case to be brought to a rapid conclusion. Too
often we have heard of an arbitral tribunal of three highly sought-after
arbitrators who are simply unable to find an available date for a hearing
during the next six months or before the next university vacation period.
9. Independence
Under the rules of many arbitral institutions, including those of the
ICC, an arbitrator must be "independent" of both of the parties. The
party which proposes a non-independent arbitrator not only risks having
its choice refused confirmation, or challenged and removed, but also runs
the risk that even if not removed the non-independent arbitrator will lack
credibility with the other co-arbitrator or chairperson of the arbitral
tribunal.
The author is firmly convinced that the wisest choice for any party
is a co-arbitrator who is sympathetic to the proposing party and who will
endeavor to see that this party's position is clearly understood by the
arbitral tribunal, while at the same time maintaining the required dis-
tance from the proposing party (meaning no discussion of the merits of
the case prior to appointment and no unilateral contacts with the party
subsequent to appointment unless authorized by the arbitral tribunal)
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and an absolute and obvious freedom of mind to find against that party
should the facts and the law lead to that conclusion.
B. Selection of Arbitrators by the ICC Court: The Factors to be
Taken into Account
While every arbitral institution may have its own rules and proce-
dures, each institution which wishes to have more than a fleeting exist-
ence must also endeavor to meet the legitimate expectations of the parties
which select it over the national courts or another arbitral institution.
The arbitral institutions therefore have a vital interest in protecting their
integrity, i.e. their ability to carry out the responsibilities incumbent
upon them by virtue of their rules. In addition, the best of the arbitral
institutions also recognize a general mission not tied to any specific arbi-
tration case, namely to encourage and promote international arbitration
as a means of dispute resolution with advantages not elsewhere available
(relative speed and economy, independence and neutrality, confidential-
ity, etc.) and which promotes the general good by facilitating the interna-
tional flow of trade and investment.
The two interests coincide with but are not subsumed by the nar-
rower interests of the parties. The arbitral institutions are therefore not
only conscious of their responsibility to satisfy as best they can the legiti-
mate expectations of the parties, but that failure to do so places in jeop-
ardy their own reputation and perhaps that of international arbitration as
a means of dispute resolution. Under these circumstances, it can safely
be said that the ICC Court is keenly aware of the importance that must
be attached to the selection of arbitrators in every one of its cases.
Indeed, the hope of the ICC Court in each case is that it will not
have to undertake this task at all because the parties will have done it.
Consistent with a philosophy that endeavors to combine the safety-net
and guarantees of supervised arbitration along with a high degree of
party autonomy, the ICC Rules provide that the parties may not only
decide the number of arbitrators, but also that the parties may nominate
the sole arbitrator (Art. 2 (3)) and the co-arbitrators may nominate the
third arbitrator (Art. 2 (4)). ICC practice obviously also permits the par-
ties themselves to nominate the third arbitrator, i.e. the Chairperson of
the Arbitral Tribunal. The English practice whereby an "umpire" may
be appointed is not authorized by the ICC Rules.
Understandably, however, the ICC Court is often called upon to
carry out the duty of selecting the sole arbitrator or chairperson. Thus,
of the sole arbitrators appointed in 1990, as has already been mentioned,
only 14% were agreed upon by the parties themselves. Of the Chairper-
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sons appointed, last year some 30% were named by either the parties
themselves or the co-arbitrators. Thus, some 70% of the Chairpersons
were appointed by the ICC, almost always through proposals made by
the various ICC National Committees around the world. Much more
rarely, the arbitration clause calls for direct appointment by, for example,
the President of the ICC or the Chairperson of the ICC Court.
When it is the ICC Court in lieu of the parties that must select a sole
arbitrator or chairperson of a National Committee, what qualifications
are sought by it and the relevant National Committee of the ICC?
Obviously, the general considerations set out above concerning the
number of arbitrators, age and health, gender, linguistic ability, availabil-
ity, and professional qualifications are also relevant for the ICC Court.
However, the considerations concerning nationality and independence
comprise elements which go beyond what the parties take into account
when selecting a co-arbitrator.
L Objective Neutrality
Objective neutrality is a formal requirement of the ICC Rules. Arti-
cle 2(6) states that "The sole arbitrator or the chair[person] of the arbi-
tral tribunal shall be chosen from a country other than those of which the
parties are nationals."
This requirement (which can be and occasionally is waived by the
agreement of both parties) is designed to help instill in the parties the
conviction that the arbitral tribunal is neutral and independent. It is this
conviction, the ICC believes, that facilitates the decision of so many los-
ing parties to honor voluntarily ICC arbitral awards.
2. Subjective Neutrality
Going from the objective to the subjective, the best international ar-
bitrators must have an open-mindness, a cultural openess and a lack of
prejudice, as well as be "internationally minded."1 Too often one hears
complaints from parties, often from Eastern Europe or a developing
country, about an arbitrator, no doubt a competent jurist, who is per-
ceived as displaying a combination of arrogance, superiority, contempt
and impatience with the party in question.
Even if those perceptions are inaccurate, or a function of hyper-sen-
sitivity, the superior arbitrators will never lose sight of the importance of
being perceived as independent and impartial as well as actually being so
and make significant efforts to avoid conveying negative impressions.
10 Lalive, supra note 3.
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3. Managerial Ability
Today's arbitrations are sufficiently complex and hard-fought to re-
quire sole arbitrators and chairpersons who can "manage" the arbitra-
tion in every sense of the term.1 They must be able to inspire and lead
the co-arbitrators, tread the very thin line between laxity and undue de-
lay on the one hand and dictatorial, unreasonable demands on the other.
They must be able to sort, store, and retrieve what may be mountains of
evidence and other information. The brilliant student of law who knows
not the world beyond his or her doctoral thesis has no place here.
4. Competence
An able lawyer of a neutral nationality who antagonizes no one and
is completely open-minded may nonetheless not be fit to be a sole arbitra-
tor or chairperson should he or she not be able to analyze, understand
and appreciate the various different national legal systems and the rea-
sons for the differing assumptions, presumptions, expectations and de-
mands of the parties. Such "legal internationalism" is the professional
complement to the "subjective neutrality" described above and the arbi-
trator with this quality will fully understand that one of the reasons why
the parties chose arbitration was precisely to avoid having the rigors of
the procedural rules of any one legal system applied as though they were
before the national courts of the arbitrator's country.
The description could go on, but by now the attentive readers will
realize that the "perfect" arbitrator does not exist on this side of heaven.
It can be hoped, though, that the above may serve as a check-list when-
ever the reader has the very heavy responsibility of selecting a co-arbitra-
tor, sole arbitrator or chairperson.
III. INDEPENDENCE OF THE ARBITRATORS:
CONFIRMATION AND CHALLENGE
Of the various qualities to look for when selecting an arbitrator, few
constitute requirements in the strict sense of the term (i.e. conditions
which if not met would lead the ICC Court to refuse to confirm or ap-
point a prospective arbitrator or even to remove a sitting arbitrator).
"Independence" is one of the few ICC mandated requirements and
continues to be the subject of tremendous interest in both legal literature
and actual practice. The ICC Rules and practice in this area will be out-
lined below.
We first return to the underlying presumption that parties would
11 Wetter, The Conduct of the Arbitration, 2 J. INT'L ARB. 7 (1985).
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never agree to arbitration in the first place unless they had confidence
that the arbitration system would take every reasonable measure to en-
sure the independence and neutrality of the arbitral tribunal. The word
"reasonable" is stressed for reasons that will be made apparent in the last
paragraphs of this paper. This has long been the position of the ICC and
it appears that the international arbitration community is swinging deci-
sively to the view that all arbitrators, including those proposed by the
parties, should be neutral and independent. 12 (The AAA still maintains
certain reservations on this matter. 3) Thus, an unstated corollary to the
dictum with which this paper opened is that "an arbitrator must not only
be good, but should appear to be good."
The ICC Rules and practice relative to the constitution of the arbi-
tral tribunal are precisely designed to produce an arbitral tribunal which
is "good" both in reality and in the eyes of the parties. This task is espe-
cially challenging in ICC arbitration because of the extreme diversity of
nationalities, legal systems, and cultures involved in ICC arbitrations.
During 1990, for example, the 365 requests for arbitration received (the
highest number in the history of the ICC) involved parties from eighty-
six different countries and the ICC Court confirmed or appointed arbitra-
tors of forty-nine different nationalities.
A. ICC Rules and Procedures Relative to Independence
In an ICC arbitration, parties may propose a co-arbitrator, sole arbi-
trator or chairperson of any nationality or profession. However, "[e]very
arbitrator appointed or confirmed by the Court must be and remain in-
dependent of the parties involved in the arbitration" (ICC Rules, Article
(7) paragraph 1).
ICC Rules and practice provide for a number of overlapping proce-
dures aimed at advising the parties and prospective arbitrators of the re-
quirement of independence and enabling the Secretariat and the
International Court of Arbitration to fulfill their responsibilities with re-
spect to this requirement. Underlying these rules and practices are three
fundamental principles.
First, no one may become an arbitrator without being either con-
firmed or appointed by the International Court of Arbitration. In gen-
eral, the ICC Rules utilize the term "confirms" when the ICC Court acts
upon an arbitrator nominated by one or more parties and the term "ap-
12 Werner, Editorial, 7 J. INT'L ARB. 5 (1990).
13 R. Coulson, AN AMERICAN CRITIQUE OF THE IBA's ETHICS FOR INTERNATIONAL ARBI-
TRATION 103 (1987).
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points" when the ICC Court acts in regard to an arbitrator not nomi-
nated by a party.
Second, regarding the requirement of independence, no distinction is
made in the rules between persons nominated by a party and those
appointed by the Court. All must be independent.
Third, the parties are automatically notified of any matter disclosed
by an arbitrator relative to his or her independence so that the party may
comment prior to the Court's decision. Facts so notified may not, after a
set period of time, become the basis for a challenge. (Art. 2 (8)).
1. "Independence" and "Impartiality"
What are the standards of independence applied by the Court?
What are the responsibilities of the arbitrators as regards their duty of
disclosure?
The term "independence" was explicitly added to the ICC Rules as
regards co-arbitrators in 1975, and only in the 1980 Internal Rules of the
Court was "independence" explicitly required for sole arbitrators and
chairpersons.
Just before completion of the review that resulted in the amended
ICC Rules in force as of January 1, 1988, the suggestion was made to
include the concept of "impartiality" in the rules as a requirement for
ICC arbitrators. This proposal was not accepted for several reasons.
First, the suggestion was made late in the revision process and to fully
examine the meaning and implications of the proposal would have signif-
icantly delayed adoption of the amended rules. Second, discussion fo-
cused on the more "objective" nature of the concept of "independence"
as compared to the "subjective" nature of the concept of "impartiality."
Third, no one could offer a satisfactory definition of "impartiality."
However, partially in response to this debate, Article 2, paragraph 8, of
the ICC Rules now explicitly provides what the Court had always under-
stood, namely that an arbitrator could be challenged "whether for an
alleged lack of independence or otherwise" (emphasis added).
Thus, the absence of a mention of "impartiality" in the ICC Rules
must not be understood as an endorsement of the idea that an arbitrator
has the right to be biased so long as he or she is independent. Nor must
the absence be understood as implying that the ICC considers that arbi-
trators nominated by a party are inherently incapable of being "impar-
tial" (however that concept is defined).
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2. The Arbitrator's Responsibility of Disclosure Prior
to Confirmation/Appointment
If the concept of arbitrator independence is to be a reality upon
which the confidence of the parties may legitimately be based rather than
a mere theory to be greeted with cynicism, the parties must demand
more than blind faith. Most especially, a meaningful procedure must
exist whereby prospective arbitrators disclose relevant information to the
parties for assessing the independence of the prospective arbitrator
concerned.
Article 2 (7) paragraph 2 of the ICC Rules provides that "Before
appointment or confirmation by the Court, a prospective arbitrator shall
disclose in writing to the Secretary General of the Court any facts or
circumstances which might be of such a nature as to call into question
the arbitrator's independence in the eyes of the parties."
Regarding the phrase "in the eyes of the parties," it must not be
read as limitative (i.e. as encouraging the potential arbitrator to say,
"Well, I would consider that fact X is pertinent to an assessment of my
independence, but I doubt the parties would do so and therefore I won't
disclose it"). Rather, the phrase is intended to encourage the arbitrator
to stretch his or her mind, to disclose facts that he or she might not
consider as "calling into question" his or her independence, but which
might do so "in the eyes of the parties." In an ICC arbitration, the par-
ties are generally of different nationalities, and therefore at least one
party is of a nationality other than that of the prospective arbitrator. In
the case of a sole arbitrator or chairperson, usually neither party is of the
same nationality. Accordingly, it is especially important that a prospec-
tive arbitrator reach beyond a purely national and domestic perspective
and make a special effort to consider the facts and circumstances relative
to his or her independence as the parties might view and construe them.
This is also desirable because, pursuant to a provision added to the
ICC Rules in 1988, a party must raise a challenge within thirty days
from the date when the party is informed of the facts on which the chal-
lenge is to be based. Thus, it is preferable to disclose as early as possible
any matters which might lead a party to question an arbitrator's indepen-
dence in order to minimize the likelihood of a challenge at a later stage of
the arbitral procedure when the consequences are most costly in terms of
both time and money, especially should the challenge be sustained.
3. The ICC "'Arbitrator's Statement of Independence"
To further the objectives just described, in late 1989 the Bureau of
the ICC Court (consisting of the Chairman and seven Vice-Chairmen of
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the Court from, respectively, France, Egypt, India, Japan, Mexico, Swe-
den, Switzerland and the United States) approved a revised text of the
"Arbitrator's Statement of Independence" which every ICC arbitrator
must fill out.
14
One element of the new form has aroused some controversy among
several arbitrators in Switzerland and Belgium, namely that past or pres-
ent relationships with the counsel of the parties as well as with the parties
themselves should be mentioned if the relationship "might be of such a
nature as to call into question [the arbitrator's] independence in the eyes
of any of the parties."' 5
One expressed reason for concern is that in a country such as Swit-
zerland or Belgium where the legal community is relatively small and
many jurists know or have professional relations with each other, the
addition of the word "counsel" to the Statement of Independence can
unfairly disqualify well-known attorneys in these countries from ever be-
coming arbitrators.
A second and broader concern is premised on the proposition that in
general lawyer-to-arbitrator relationships should be considered as differ-
ent than party-to-arbitrator relations in that when they are routine (i.e.
not close or lasting or involving the earning of significant professional
fees in the context of these relations) they are of such a nature as not to
warrant disclosure.
The author believes that for a number of reasons such concerns are
unwarranted and/or miss the essential point.
First, there must not be a misunderstanding about the objectives and
consequences of the Statement of Independence. The fact of disclosure
itself is in no way conclusive as to the independence or lack thereof of the
prospective arbitrator. A mention on the Statement of a particular rela-
tionship does not mean that the arbitrator concerned automatically lacks
independence and cannot be confirmed or appointed. It simply means
that while confirming an independent status, the prospective arbitrator
has set down points which might, in the eyes of a party, call into question
his or her independence. The disclosure thus serves to provide the parties
with an opportunity to raise, sooner rather than later, any concerns they
might have regarding the prospective arbitrator's independence.
Second, the world of arbitration is growing in both scope and so-
phistication. Of those Statements of Independence where the arbitrator
has called certain facts or circumstances to the attention of the parties, in
14 See Appendix I.




over 95% of the cases the parties raise no objections to the arbitrator
concerned.
For example, in one recent case a proposed co-arbitrator filed a
Statement which contained the following:
I know well two senior members of the law firm representing the claimants:
Dr. X (a fellow examiner at the Law Faculty at the National University)
and an Englishman who has now retired out of Singapore. But I have yet
to meet Mr. Y who has been handling this case; I have only spoken to him
on the phone a few times.
I also know well a senior lawyer (Mr. Z) representing the respondent.
Both Singapore and Malaysia are small countries, and it is common for
judges and senior lawyers to know each other - some professionally, some
socially and some both professionally and socially.
Neither party raised an objection and the co-arbitrator was confirmed.
Such examples are not unusual and illustrate the utility of the re-
vised form of the Statement of Independence, namely that information is
brought out as early as possible in the arbitration process and may not be
used by a party as a basis for challenging the arbitrator concerned except
within the brief period provided for in the Rules (Art. 2 (8)).
The third reason why a proposed arbitrator need not be overly con-
cerned about automatic disqualification should they disclose a relation-
ship with a counsel for one of the parties is that even should a party
object to confirmation on the basis of the information disclosed, the ICC
Court makes the final decision regarding confirmation. In doing so, it
will obviously evaluate carefully the information disclosed and the objec-
tions of the party. Should the objections be frivolous or in bad faith, the
Court can and will reject them.
The fourth reason why the concerns expressed are not convincing is
that should there indeed be a relationship between an arbitrator and a
counsel which creates a situation where independence is not only per-
ceived as being lacking but actually is lacking, it would serve neither the
interests of the parties nor of the legal community concerned to refuse
disclosure of such a relationship on the grounds that a Statement of Inde-
pendence contained no mention of relationships with counsel for the par-
ties as a factor to be taken into account by the prospective arbitrators.
Openness in this regard can only help instill a renewed or confirmed con-
fidence in the parties that, notwithstanding the relatively small legal com-
munity of the country concerned, its arbitrators are aware of the possible
apprehensions of parties from beyond that country and are ready to meet
those apprehensions with full and frank disclosure. This is but another
aspect of the "internationally minded" qualification which is so impor-
tant for arbitrators involved in international commercial arbitration.
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Finally, the ICC has no desire to deprive itself of qualified arbitra-
tors for frivolous reasons. Should the new Statement of Independence
ever lead to that result, the Statement can and will be modified in an
appropriate manner.
IV. THE EXPERIENCE OF THE ICC
A. Facts and Figures
What standards does the ICC apply when confirming or appointing
independent arbitrators? Given the different procedures and conse-
quences involved, are the standards applied by the Court the same when
it decides whether or not to confirm an arbitrator at the commencement
of an arbitration, as when it decides whether or not to accept a challenge
of an arbitrator on the basis of an alleged lack of independence after the
arbitral tribunal has been constitued and possibly has proceeded far
along in the matter? Has a "case law" developed from decisions by the
ICC Court? The following discussion draws upon a 1989 study bearing
on these questions.
16
1. The number of instances in which a party raised a point related to
the independence of a prospective arbitrator is rare.
Only in regard to approximately 3% of the arbitrators were matters
related to independence raised. Of these, the majority were either not
confirmed or withdrew from consideration. Of the remaining persons
who were confirmed or appointed, only one had been subsequently chal-
lenged during the seven years prior to 1989 and the Court rejected the
challenge.
2. More prospective arbitrators have not been confirmed/appointed on
the basis of independence-related considerations than have
sitting arbitrators been removed due to a challenge
based on an alleged lack of
independence.
Of the 3% of the prospective arbitrators in regard to whom matters
relating to independence were raised, about three-quarters (72%) were
not confirmed or appointed by the Court either because they withdrew
voluntarily or, in most cases, because the Court did not confirm them.
This figure of 72% can be compared to the 10.5% of challenges against
sitting arbitrators accepted over the past seven years. (Only seven of sev-
16 For a lengthier treatment of this subject see Bond, The Selection of ICC Arbitrators and the
Requirement of Independence, 4 Arb. Int'l 300 (1988).
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enty-five challenges were accepted by the ICC Court during the past
seven years. However, it should be noted that in the year and a half prior
to 1990, while only one challenge out of sixteen was accepted, in five of
the sixteen cases the challenged arbitrator resigned before the ICC Court
could act.)
Does this mean that different, more strict standards are applied by
the Court when deciding upon confirmation/appointment as opposed to
when deciding upon a challenge? The response is of necessity a nuanced
one, for to take the raw data at face value could lead to erroneous
conclusions.
First, it is quite likely that the Court's refusals to confirm/appoint
prospective arbitrators result in weeding out the more obvious, easier
cases of non-independence, leaving the more difficult or dubious cases to
the challenge procedure. Second, parties have somewhat less incentive to
request the non-confirmation of a prospective arbitrator merely as a de-
laying tactic at such an early stage before they have a sense of how the
arbitral tribunal is leaning. Thus, requests for non-confirmation most
often appear to reflect deeply-felt concerns rather than procedural ploys
or delaying tactics.
It can also be imagined that the members of the International Court
of Arbitration are extremely conscious of the desirability of commencing
each arbitration with the greatest possible degree of party confidence in
the arbitral tribunal, and the Court may accord more weight to party
objections which are obviously not frivolous or in bad faith than would
be the case if the same objections were raised in the form of a challenge
during the course of an arbitration.
Likewise, in the face of a serious concern raised by a party which
might not present a conclusive case of lack of independence on behalf of
a prospective arbitrator, the ICC Court, for the reasons stated above, is
no doubt less reluctant to have the prospective arbitrator voluntarily
withdrawn prior to confirmation than the Court would be to have a chal-
lenged arbitrator voluntarily resign in the absence of facts that estab-
lished a strong likelihood of lack of independence. (Indeed, the ICC
Rules now require that the Court explicitly accept an arbitrator's ten-
dered resignation.)
It is well known that there is a difference in the ICC procedures for
deciding upon confirmations/appointments and upon challenges. The
former are handled by a Committee of the Court while challenges, by
virtue of an explicit provision in the Internal Rules, are considered only
in the Plenary. (Of course, should there not be unanimity in the Com-
mittee the matter is sent to the Plenary. This occurs very rarely.) This
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distinction is probably in part due to a recognition that the consequences
for the challenged arbitrator and for the parties in terms of time and cost
can be far greater if a challenge is upheld than if a prospective arbitrator
is not confirmed/appointed.
In sum, the standards of what constitutes a lack of independence do
not differ according to the point at which an allegation of a lack of inde-
pendence is raised; rather, at the confirmation/appointment stage, Court
members are more ready to take into consideration not only the relative
seriousness of the facts presented regarding the independence of a pro-
posed co-arbitrator, but also the desirability of commencing an arbitra-
tion on as solid a footing as possible and of preventing challenges later in
the arbitration when the consequences to the parties in terms of lost time
and money could be of far greater magnitude.
B. Grounds for Non-Confirmation or Appointment
As with challenges, the Court does not communicate its rationale
regarding appointments or confirmations. This is consistent with the ad-
ministrative, as opposed to jurisdictional, nature of the Court's role. Of
course, in virtually every instance the parties and the prospective arbitra-
tor concerned are fully aware of the facts relating to independence which
have been placed before the Court. These facts are set out either in the
Statement of Independence of the prospective arbitrator or in the request
for non-confirmation of a party, and each of these documents would have
been notified by the Secretariat to all concerned for comment within a
fixed time-period. The ICC Rules do not provide for an exchange of any
comments subsequently submitted by the parties or other arbitrators.
Regarding the source of the Court's standards in deciding upon
matters of independence, it has correctly been observed that the Court
does not act as an institutional appendage of any national court system.
At the same time the Court does bear in mind the general mandate of
Article 26 of the ICC Rules that the Court of Arbitration shall act in the
spirit of the rules and shall make every effort to make sure that the award
is enforceable at law. As stated above, the Court members certainly have
in mind the desirability of promoting to the greatest extent possible the
confidence of the parties in the arbitral tribunal, although such an objec-
tive must be balanced against the objective of avoiding unwarranted de-
lays and discouraging dilatory manoeuvres.
Likewise, the ICC Court takes into account in assessing each case
whether the particular facts demonstrate a close, substantial, recent and
proven relationship between a party and a prospective arbitrator. Great
weight is also accorded to the views of the parties. Where, in the face of
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a Statement of Independence with reservations, the parties raise no objec-
tions to the prospective arbitrator, the Court almost always confirms or
appoints the arbitrator. (Of course in every one of these instances the
prospective arbitrator will have stated that the disclosed facts do not af-
fect his or her independence and that he or she is, in fact, independent.)
Further, in almost each instance where a party has objected to a confir-
mation of a prospective co-arbitrator based on reservations in the State-
ment of Independence, the Court has refused confirmation. Thus, the
parties' views are not necessarily decisive, but this author's assessment is
that the Court is reluctant to be "more royalist than the King" by refus-
ing confirmation of a proposed arbitrator when the non-proposing party
has no objections after having an opportunity to weigh the relevant infor-
mation. In addition, as noted, the Court would be reluctant to confirm
someone over objections which are grounded on non-frivolous concerns
and do not appear to be made for solely dilatory purposes.
Turning from the general to the more concrete, the most common
basis for refusal by the ICC Court to confirm or appoint a prospective
arbitrator is a past or present direct professional link between the arbitra-
tor and a party, or between a business associate of the arbitrator and a
party or an entity connected to a party. Typical in this regard are pro-
spective arbitrators who as lawyers had recently represented a party in
other matters or whose partners had done so, and persons having acted
in the past as advisors for a party.
It is essential to take note, however, of the many nuances present in
decisions where such links were alleged and/or disclosed. For example,
in one case a prospective arbitrator submitted a Statement of Indepen-
dence with the reservation that another partner in his 800 lawyer firm
had acted for a party in an unrelated matter about which the prospective
arbitrator knew nothing. The other party to the arbitration did not re-
quest non-confirmation and the Court confirmed the arbitrator. The
Court has also confirmed as co-arbitrator, in the absence of objection
from the other party, a nominee who had provided legal services to a
corporation one of whose officers was also an officer of the party propos-
ing the nominee.
In another case, even without an objection raised by the other party,
the Court refused to confirm a nominee whose law firm was concurrently
acting for the party which had proposed the nominee.
Nominees have been refused confirmation in instances where the
nominee had professional ties to a party's counsel. (In one case a pro-
spective arbitrator who was a Q.C. had been retained by defendant's
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counsel to plead a matter unrelated to the arbitration and the opposing
party objected.)
The ICC Court has not considered that a nominee's having the same
nationality as a party constitutes a lack of independence. This point gen-
erally, although not always, arises in connection with nominees coming
from Eastern Europe when proposed by a party of the same nationality.
The ICC Court bases its decisions in each case on the concrete facts
regarding the relationship of the prospective arbitrator and the parties
involved and not on sweeping generalizations about the legal, political or
social conditions in particular countries.
C. Challenges
Much of what has just been said in regard to confirmation and ap-
pointment of arbitrators also pertains to challenges. The standard of
what constitutes independence is the same. However, for reasons set out
above, the Court will accept a challenge only when the party introducing
the challenge has met the burden of demonstrating that the arbitrator has
failed to comply with the duty to be independent. 7 Over the past seven
years only seven challenges have actually been accepted, generally be-
cause of a professional relationship between the arbitrator and the party,
or the Counsel of a party. In a few instances the removal of the arbitrator
was because of errors in conduct such as where an arbitrator insisted on
deciding a case on documents alone although one party had requested a
hearing. (See Art. 14 (1) of the ICC Rules.)
The ICC Rules relative to challenges, in effect since January 1, 1988,
codify the concept that challenges must be introduced in a timely manner
in order to be receivable. Together with the new Statement of Indepen-
dence which is intended to bring into the light as early as possible most of
the likely grounds for challenge, the ICC Court has witnessed a slight
decline in the number of challenges over the past two years, reversing
what had been an upward trend.
V. CONCLUSIONS
1. Even if a satisfactory definition of the concept of independence were
possible, it would be of very limited use to the ICC Court in deciding
specific instances of whether or not to confirm or appoint prospective
arbitrators.
17 This is not a formal definition of a strict legal standard. Clearly, more than mere allegations
are required. However, an argument which convincingly raises substantial doubts about the arbitra-
tor's independence might well suffice.
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For example, the most obvious fact of a financial interest in a party
only offers a general guideline. After all, ownership of shares worth $100
in a company cannot be equated with ownership of shares worth $1 mil-
lion. And where would shares worth $10,000 fall on the scale? Would it
depend on the relative wealth of the prospective arbitrator? Each case
requires an appreciation of the relevant facts and no code of ethics, how-
ever, detailed, can substitute for such an appreciation.
2. The decisions of the ICC Court on questions of independence should
not be used to establish a "case law" on the subject.
Every decision takes into account such unique factors as the specific
information available, who provided it and when, the views of the par-
ties, as well as the balance to be drawn among the goals of trying to
ensure the confidence of the parties in the procedure, the desire to avoid
unwarranted delay and the need to ensure insofar as possible the enforce-
ability of the award.
3. The present ICC system of considering matters related to the inde-
pendence of arbitrators at the stage of confirmation or appointment as
well as the possibility of challenges later in the procedure generally meets
the difficulties arising from the broad diversity of participants, counsel
and arbitrators involved in ICC arbitrations. One can judge this success
from the relative rarity of challenges to arbitrators once confirmed, the
continued high rate of voluntary compliance with ICC awards and the
paucity of efforts to annul ICC awards based on an alleged lack of inde-
pendence of arbitrators.
4. Satisfaction with the present ICC system is not complacency. One
continues to hear occasional stories of arbitrators whose behavior does
not meet standards of independence upon which all could agree.
5. The greatest care should be exercised before indulging in "radical"
efforts to ensure the complete independence of every arbitrator. Such
efforts might include requiring extremely detailed disclosure statements,
appointing all arbitrators directly by an arbitral institution without par-
ticipation of the parties, or establishing a mandatory and binding code of
ethics.
Without going into a discussion of the pros and the cons of such
measures, any consideration of them must have as a leitmotif the ques-
tion of whether the adoption of radical solutions would be in the interests
of those whom international arbitration is primarily intended to serve:
not the lawyers, or the arbitrators, or the arbitral institutions, but the
parties.
Those public, quasi-public and private entities, as well as individu-
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als, from everywhere on the globe, voluntarily agree to international arbi-
tration because it is a system of dispute resolution that provides a means
of deciding disputes that is, at least in comparison with litigation before
national courts, neutral, confidential, relatively rapid and less expensive,
more flexible, and generally final. The confidence of these parties in the
fairness and justness of arbitration as a means of dispute resolution is also
in part, but only in part, based on their expectation that arbitral tribunals
will be composed entirely of independent arbitrators. It is questionable
whether parties would be willing to forego many of the other advantages
of arbitration as the price to be paid for efforts to ensure the absolute
independence of every member of every arbitral tribunal.
This paper noted the importance of an independent arbitrator for a
"good" arbitration. Nonetheless, in considering proposals aimed at
reaching to the greatest extent possible the laudable objective of the inde-
pendence of every arbitrator, let us never forget that "The best is the
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To: The International Court of Arbitration
International Chamber of Commerce
38 Cours Albert ler F - 75008 Paris
ARBITRATOR'S STATEMENT OF INDEPENDENCE*
I, the undersigned,
First Name
hereby declare that I accept to serve as arbitrator under the ICC Rules of Arbitration
in the instant case.
(If this box is checked, please also check one of the two following boxes. The choice of which box to
check will be determined after you have taken into account inter alia whether there exists any past or
present relationship, direct or indirect, with any of the parties or any of their counsel, whether financial,
professional or of another kind and whether the nature of ary such relationship is such that disclosure is
called for pursuant to the criteria set out below. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of disclosure.
El I am Independent of each of the parties and intend to remain so; to the best of my
knowledge, there are no facts or circumstances, past or present, that need be disclosed
because they might be of such nature as to call into question my independence In the
eyes of any of the parties.
El I am Independent of each of the parties and intend to remain so; however, in
consideration of Article 2, paragraph 7 of the ICC Rules of Arbitration**, I wish to call
your attention to the following facts or circumstances which I hereafter disclose because
I consider that they might be of such a nature as to call into question my independence
in the eyes of any of the parties. (Use separate sheet if necessary.)
hereby declare that I decline to serve as arbitrator in the subject case. (If you wish to
state the reasons for checking this box, please do so.)
Date: Signature:
* Please mark the relevant box or boxes.
-Article 2 (7):
'Every arbitrator appointed or confirmed by the
Court must be and remain independent of the
parties in the arbitration. Before appointment or
confirmation by the Court, a prospective arbitrator
shall disclose in writing to the Secretary General of
the Court any facts or circumstances which might
be of such a nature as to call into question the
arbitratoes independence in the eyes of the
parties.
Upon receipt of such information, the Secretary
General of the Court shall provide it to the parties in
writing and fix a time-limit for any comments from
them.
An arbitrator sal immediately disclose in writing to
the Secretary General of the Court and the parties any
facts or circumstances of a similar nature which may
arise between the arbitrator's appointment or
confirmation by the Court and the notification of the
final award.*
Name
El
Place:
Arbitration Case No.
